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INERT ANTITRUST ADMINISTRATION: FORMULA PRICING
AND THE CEMENT INDUSTRY
SAMUEL M. LOESCHERi"
WE have been told that a streamlining and supercharging of antitrust ma-
chinery, to increase its enforcement efficiency, has been undertaken by the
Justice Department's Antitrust Division ' and the Federal Trade Commission.2
This may be so, but in at least one instance the increase in streamlining and
power rating has apparently been such that the speed of the new model has
blurred the vision of the pilots, and the public has suffered a fractured toe in a
hitherto unreported hit and run proceeding. The incident occurred in the area
of geographical pricing formulas, specifically with reference to their use in the
cement industry: it was the dismissal, on August 27, 1953, of the Justice Depart-
ment's eight year old complaint against the cement industry.3 This dismissal
has, not unnaturally, been applauded in the trade press, 4 and it has deluded
two capable specialists in industrial organization;r but its significance seems
otherwise to have gone unnoticed.
It is the purpose of this article to suggest that the Justice Department must
have experienced at least momentary blindness when it reached the decision
i Assistant Professor of Economics, Indiana University. This article is based on certain
sections of the author's forthcoming book, ImPsuERcr COLLUSION IN THE CEMENT INDUS-
TRY, to be published in 1956.
1. See Brownell Wants Trust Laws to Aid, Not Stifle, Business-Proud of Case
Volume of Terminations, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1954, p. 1, col. 6; U.S. Is Abandoning
Old Suit on Cement-Most Goals of Antitrust Case Won by Voluntary Action of Defend-
ants, id., Aug. 28, 1953, p. 25, col. 4.
2. See F.T.C. Head Lists Big Gains it Year-Hearing of Cases Has Beet Speeded,
Load Slashed, He Tells Bar Association, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1954, p. 22, col. 1; F.T.C.
Seeks Means to Enforce Orders-Many Actions Forgotten, id., Sept. 22, 1953, p. 45, col. 1.
3. United States v. Cement Institute, CCH TRADE Ra. REP. ff 66090 (1953). De-
fendants' motion that the case be dismissed had been denied on July 18, 1949, United
States v. Cement Institute, 85 F. Supp. 344 (D. Colo.). The Justice Department's Ce-
ment Institute suit, which had been filed on February 28, 1945 in the United States District
Court in Denver, Colorado, will be referred to hereinafter as the Denver Cement case.
4. Rock Products, Oct. 1953, p. 67. This editorial, however, confused the case, at-
tributing the dismissal to the FTC.
5. DnLu.A & KAHIN, FAIm CoMPEI TIoN 128 (1954), cites the Attorney General's
announcement as constituting proof of the success of the FTC's Cement Institute order,
Cement Institute, 37 F.T.C. 87 (1943), ordered enforced, FTC v. Cement Institute, 333
U.S. 683 (1948). The authors seem to have been convinced by the Justice Department's
reasoning-which, as will be shown, was fallacious.
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to drop the Denver Cement case. The Department explained in a press release I
that trade practices had been sufficiently altered so as to render unwarranted
the continued prosecution of the Government's case. The Department appeared
to be relying upon either or both of two sorts of alleged changes in the current
cement industry which began in the summer of 1948: (a) a general introduc-
tion of posted f.o.b. mill prices available to buyers desiring transportation
by truck; and (b) a more frequent occurrence of nonidentical destination
prices.7 To the extent that reliance was placed upon the alleged widespread
change from the industry's custom of refusing to sell at the mill to trucks of
buyers, it will be shown that the Justice Department either was careless in
evaluating the reliability of its trucking information, or else failed properly to
interpret that information. To the extent that reliance was placed upon the
reduced frequency of identical destination prices, it will be argued that the
Justice Department faltered in its economic analysis by failing to understand
that nonidentical prices were essentially a temporary phenomenon, in part a
natural result of the postwar cement boom and in part the intentional result
of a political strategy designed to secure special legislation permitting geo-
graphical pricing formulas.
Most importantly-and unfortunately-the Attorney General's press release
evinced confidence that the FTC's outstanding order against the cement indus-
try 8 would be amply effective in preventing a reintroduction of noncompetitive
pricing practices, 9 the implication being that the Justice Department's prayer
for relief was unnecessary. However, it will be demonstrated that one pro-
vision in the Department's prayer for relief was in fact distinctly superior to
anything found in the FTC's order. Whereas a self-enforcing feature in the
Justice Department order would have struck at the heart of formula pricing
on commercial sales, the FTC order will not by itself prevent a re-emergence
of formula pricing on such sales. The problem of enforcing the FTC order
will remain a difficult one, necessitating a venturesome presentation of novel
theories of compliance which the current Commission reportedly prefers to
avoid.
The superiority of the Justice Department's proposed solution to the prob-
lem of noncompetitive pricing over that of the FTC is the crucial fact that
makes the Department's dismissal of its Denver Cement case regrettable; and
it is only in the light of this fact that the inadequacy of the Department's
economic analysis of recent developments in the cement industry becomes sig-
nificant. The superiority of the Justice Department's remedy lay in its recog-
nition of the critical importance of trucking as a factor affecting cement pricing
6. United States v. Cement Institute, CCH TRAE REa. Rm. ff 66090 (Aug. 27, 1953)
(Justice Department press release announcing dismissal).
7. Id. at p. 66147.
8. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948), reversing Aetna Portland Cement
Co. v. FTC, 157 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1946), and ordering enforcewmit of Cement Institute,
37 F.T.C. 87 (1943).




practices. Trucking-or, more specifically, uncontrolled trucking-is the cru-
cial factor of which the Department of Justice was seemingly once aware but
which the FTC and virtually all commentators have overlooked. The differ-
ences between the two agencies' remedies must, then, be examined, and the
critical factor that distinguishes them must be explained.
FORMULA PRICING AND THE JUSTIcE DEPARTMENT'S REMEDY
The FTC entered its order against the cement industry in 1943 ;10 the
Justice Department filed its complaint in the Denver Cement case in 1945,11
while the FTC order was awaiting hearing on appeal. The complaints in both
actions sought to enjoin various co-operative marketing practices such as
identical pricing on sealed bids, co-operative circulation of freight rate books,
co-operative classification of buyers, co-operative efforts to restrict trucking,
and formal associational activities such as those undertaken by the Cement
Institute. However, whereas the FTC's complaint, findings and order seemed
to look primarily toward a Robinson-Patman Act violation,' 2 the Justice De-
partment's complaint was not directly concerned with price discrimination., 3
It sought to enjoin such geographical price discrimination only in the cases
of identical sealed biddings and applications of punitive base prices against the
mills of price shaders. The Department's complaint was directed rather to the
formula feature of multiple basing point delivered pricing systems-this form-
ula being the minimum combination of the base prices of rival mills plus fixed,
known transportation charges. The Justice Department sought to remove the
fixed element upon which systematic formula pricing depends, by asking the
court in paragraph 6 of its prayer to require each defendant to offer its buyers
10. Cement Institute, 37 F.T.C. 87 (1943).
11. Complaint, United States v. Cement Institute, Civil No. 1291, D. Colo., June 28,
1945.
The Justice Department appeared to have three reasons for filing its complaint. First,
in the event that the FTC were to be overruled in both higher courts, it wished to have
a complaint ready for trial. Second, the Department disagreed with the FTC as to which
pricing practices were more likely to be competitive: while the FTC appeared to be advo-
cating uniform f.o.b. mill pricing, the Justice Department believed in the merits of un-
systematic freight absorption and interpenetration of markets. Finally, the Department
felt that it had a more effective remedy for formula pricing than was to be found in the
FTC order.
Trial of the Denver Cement suit was delayed until after the final disposition of the
FTC order. Various delays then intervened until, on August 27, 1953, the Department
announced dismissal of the suit. United States v. Cement Institute, CCH TADE REG.
REP. ff 66090 (1953).
12. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952), amending 38 STAT. 730 (1914)
(price discrimination). The FTC proceedings also charged and found a violation of § 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended. 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1952) (unfair methods of competition).
13. The Justice Department's suit charged a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act,
26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952) (contract, combination or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade).
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the choice between a delivered price and a posted base price f.o.b. mill, and
to allow buyers to arrange their own transportation when purchasing at the
posted mill price.
14
Unlike a requirement of compulsory f.o.b. mill pricing, paragraph 6 of the
Justice Department's prayer would have encouraged freight absorption and
interpenetration of markets-of the unsystematic, competitive variety.'r De-
livered prices would continue to be permissible for their legitimate purpose
of enabling a seller safely to invade wider market areas. If he could not offer
a delivered price, the seller who sought to penetrate markets of rivals would
have to offer a reduced f.o.b. mill price to compensate for the additional
transportation charges, running the risk that the distant buyer might then
engage in arbitrage operations and resell the low-priced cement in the higher-
priced local market of the selling mill. The only f.o.b. mill price required by
paragraph 6 was the posted (established) base price, which of course would
be of interest only to buyers within a mill's natural market. In sum, para-
graph 6 offered an affirmative encouragement to competition which would not
have been provided by a requirement that all prices be f.o.b. mill.
But more important, paragraph 6 would have promoted competition even
more effectively in a negative way, by torpedoing the pricing formula. For-
mula pricing requires an element of certainty which paragraph 6 would have
destroyed, by prying open the cement mills to the trucks of buyers.
The Significance of Uncontrolled Trucking
The Justice Department was well aware that the basic collective interest of
cement manufacturers in refusing sales to trucks of local buyers lay in the
preservation of a system of known transportation charges for use in pricing
formulas. When the only transportation available to the buyer is the common
carrier, whose rates are published and easily ascertainable, it is a simple
14. "6. That each of the defendant cement manufacturers, and any of their subsidi-
aries or affiliated companies, their officers, directors, agents, and employees, and their
respective successors, assignees, and transferees be required
(a) To quote prices and to sell cement on either an f.o.b. plant basis or a delivered
price basis, at the election of the buyer;
(b) To establish for each mill separately the same mill price for all buyers from
such mill who are of the same class, purchasing similar quantities, and without
reference to destination point or use;
(c) To refrain from varying or changing such base mill price regardless of the
mode of transportation employed by the buyer."
Amended Complaint, p. 20, United States v. Cement Institute, Civil No. 1291, D. Colo.,
June 28, 1945.
It is true that the FTC order also prohibited refusals to allow customers to provide
their own trucking, but the prohibition was limited to refusals based on "any planned
common course of action, understanding, agreement, combination, or conspiracy." Cement
Institute, 37 F.T.C. 87, 260 (1943).
15. Of course formula pricing also involves freight absorption and interpenetration of
markets, but they are of the systematic sort that insulates the sellers from price com-
petition.
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matter for the penetrating seller to meet, yet avoid beating, competition at any
given destination. He merely quotes a delivered price equal to the rival's
base price plus the known transportation charge from the rival's mill to the
buyer. If buyers were given the opportunity, they would frequently find it less
expensive for short distance hauling to use trucks of private contractors or
their own trucks (particularly when excess capacity exists), than to use
common carrier trucks or common carrier rails at regulated rates. But the
transportation charges in such cases are no longer known to the penetrating
seller at the time he quotes his prices: What will be the freight to the buyer
who negotiates a freight charge with some independent trucking contractor?
Even more, what will be the opportunity cost of freight to the purchaser who
hauls in his own, and possibly otherwise idle, truck? The pricing formula
no longer works. The distant mill that wishes to penetrate the local market
areas of a rival cannot quote a delivered price that will result in an identical
cost to the buyer who has the opportunity to arrange his own transportation
from the local mill. In the absence of an ascertainable transportation factor,
the distant mills will be unable exactly to meet competition at many destina-
tions. If they seek to win the patronage of buyers in the local markets of rival
mills they will almost certainly have to beat competition. The improved bar-
gaining position of the buyers will assure such a result. If such beating of
competition were to become prevalent, as seems likely to happen, we might
expect a downward pressure to develop on the base mill prices. And such
unsystematic pricing, where induced by an unsettled trucking situation, has in
the past had a habit of spreading to areas beyond the range of economical
trucking.
Evidence abounds in the record of the FTC's Cement Institute case 16 as
to the destabilizing effect of uncontrolled trucking. For instance, a vice presi-
dent of Lone Star Cement Corporation, the nation's third largest cement
company, with a chain of mills east of the Rocky Mountains, wrote to another
concern in November 1929:
"I could write you a thesis on trucking. Properly handled, in territories
of small consumption, trucking is a very satisfactory means of transporta-
tion. Under all other conditions it exerts a most demoralizing influence
over the market affected .... The Medusa Company supplies the major
requirements of the City of Toledo under a very vicious trucking arrange-
ment .... The Detroit market is demoralized .... Cleveland has suffered
for years as a result of indiscriminate trucking .... Pittsburgh has been
upset....
"We have been trucking for years from our Houston and Dallas plants
in Texas without difficulty. These markets are also served by the Trinity
Company. The only trucks served are those operated by a trucking
concern which has a published line of rates to the various parts of the
cities, which have been zoned and priced for the information of the con-
sumers and producers alike. . . . The delivered prices in various parts
16. Transcript of Record, Cement Institute, 37 F.T.C. 87 (1943). Exhibits available
for inspection at offices of FTC, Washington, D.C.
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of the cities are based on the mill price to the manufacturer, plus the
published cost of transportation from the producer's plant to the zone of
the city in question.
"Eastern Pennsylvania and Northern New Jersey for the past few
years have been a veritable madhouse. Indiscriminate trucking has
brought forth greater and greater concessions by producers, until it
finally reached the point at which manufacturers were absorbing thirty
and forty cents a barrel in order to lay cement down on the job ...
"The question has not yet been solved. I believe we will not reach a
solution until trucking is entirely eliminated or else a plan similar to
the one which we have followed for years in Texas is adopted." 17
Officials of Lehigh Portland Cement Company, the second largest cement
company, with mills in most areas of the country, responded to a questionnaire
in the middle thirties as follows:
"The manufacturer, striving to figure his prices on indeterminate and
fluctuating trucking rates to meet the equally fluctuating rates from his
competitor's plant, quickly found himself engaged in blind, reckless and
destructive competition.
"By 1932 it was clear that trucking practices were one of the chief
contributory causes of the state of chaos and demoralization in which the
industry found itself. When about August 1932, one manufacturer an-
nounced he would no longer load trucks but would sell only in carload
lots, his action was met by practically all manufacturers in the Lehigh
Valley area. This action was primarily the result of the desperate con-
dition of the industry and the general realization that only by the elimina-
tion of the destructive practices associated with trucking could there be
any hope of improvement."'I s
The President of Penn-Dixie Cement Corporation, at the time the fifth largest
company, with a chain of mills primarily in Pennsylvania and Tennessee,
wrote in 1935:
"[I]f a manufacturer should use the trucks of his customers . . . one
customer might feel that since he already had trucks which were not being
used, . . . the cement was being delivered at little added cost above mill
price while another customer might take into consideration all of his
trucking costs including depreciation and interest on his money. The
latter customer of course would feel that he could not meet the prices
at which the first mentioned customer would resell his cement.
"It is quite true that any deviation from the uniform price structure
works in cumulative fashion and cannot be limited to a few isolated cases
without doing serious harm."'19
The officials of the cement industry did not content themselves with lament-
ing the ill effects of uncontrolled trucking; they took action. Beginning in the
17. Id., Commission Exhibit 1203 TT-UU.
18. Id., Commission Exhibit 969-14 M.
19. Id., Commission Exhibit 971-20 Z-21 A.
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fall of 1929 arbitrary charges (fifteen cents per barrel), about ten per cent
above the base mill price on rail shipments, were placed on truck shipments
from many mills in a effort to discourage trucking by minimizing the range
of trucking's economic advantage.2 0 Finally, after a series of industry meetings
in 1931 and 1932, trucking was completely eliminated in most regions of the
United States.2 1 In one area where trucking was continued-the state of
Michigan and certain counties along the Great Lakes-the, residual trucking
was rigidly controlled. In this Great Lakes area not only was truck delivery
limited to particular counties, but even in those counties the transporting trucks
were either those of the cement manufacturer or else those of a designated
contract or common carrier charging publicly announced truck rates.
22 With
buyers denied the opportunity of loading their own trucks at the sellers' mills,
transportation charges were definitely known and a geographical pricing
formula could generate stable, identical destination prices.
Although uncontrolled trucking had its principal impact in eroding geo-
graphical pricing formulas, it also tended to upset dealer-manufacturer rela-
tions in situations where freight absorption was not involved. Many dealers
were opposed to the loading of buyers' trucks at the mills, and supported
conferences sponsored by the railroads to abolish trucking. However, it seems
likely that the cement manufacturers abolished trucking as much for the pur-
pose of reducing pressures from non-trucking dealers for price concessions
as for that of simply pacifying unhappy customers. How had trucking upset
dealer relations? Some dealers doing their own trucking were able to pass
their realized transportation savings on to consumers in the form of lower
prices. Rival dealers (particularly if committed to a capital investment in a
rail siding) complained to the manufacturer about such "unfair" transporta-
tion advantages and price cutting by their rivals. And of course, frequently
the complaints developed into pressures for price concessions. In addition,
dealers who performed their own truck transportation were in a position to
"violate" exclusive distribution territories. These "unscrupulous" dealers fre-
quently diverted truck shipments into markets of rivals,23 and such invasions
incurred the wrath of rival dealers even if the intruders did not shade their profit
margins on such sales. When dealers hauling their own cement dumped at
reduced prices into the franchise territories of rival dealers, a situation re-
20. Id., Commission Exhibits 2583,2584, 1203 UU.
21. Brief for Respondents, vol. III, pp. 1530-1662, FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S.
683 (1948).
It is not known at exactly how many cement mills trucking had been allowed, but
the cement companies that replied to a 1935 questionnaire sponsored by the Cement Insti-
tute indicated that trucking had been permitted at some period during the twenties or
early thirties at 112 of their 117 cement mills. Cement Institute, 37 F.T.C. 87, 198 (1943).
22. Brief for Respondents, app. A, vol. III, pp. 1453-74, 1667-1703, FTC v. Cement In-
stitute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
23. Arbitrage was rarely involved in such diversions since the mill price applicable
to buyers' trucks was generally identical to (or above) the posted base mill price on rail
shipments.
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suited similar to the recent and widely publicized bootlegging of "used" new
cars by automobile dealers. As price competition among the dealers increased,
the dealers became more insistent in their demands for price reductions by the
manufacturers.2 4 To avoid transferring this price competition to the manu-
facturers' level, the producers eliminated uncontrolled trucking and proceeded
to argue that the action was undertaken merely to appease the majority of
the dealers.2 5 Instead of this "dealer" argument proving that the elimination of
uncontrolled trucking was unrelated to the manufacturers' own interests, how-
ever, it provided insight into the backlash effect of competitive pressures and
served to provide the Justice Department with a supplementary argument in
support of the remedy proposed in paragraph 6.
Cement manufacturers have sometimes offered another argument for the
regulation or outright elimination of trucking. During the FTC hearings they
testified repeatedly that the loading of buyers' trucks was fraught with incon-
veniences and high costs. 26 The intended implication was that sheer practical
economy was the motive for eliminating such expensive and unremunerative
loading services. Yet the FTC proceedings disclosed that in the period prior
to the hearings scarcely any manufacturer cited individual cost disadvantages
as an explanation for eliminating the loading of buyers' trucks.2 7 Further-
more, it seems unlikely that loading trucks would be more costly than load-
ing rail cars; and in any event, any premium that could be justified by the
cost differential in the two manners of loading would probably be small, and
hardly sufficient to overcome the incentives of buyers to truck. Presumably
the Justice Department would have tolerated "extras" to the posted f.o.b. mill
price for loading buyers' trucks when they could be fully cost-justified.
The Justice Department's proposed remedy for the basing point system of
formula pricing is rarely mentioned in the prolific basing point literature of
the last decade, and where it is mentioned its significance is seldom sufficiently
explained.2 8  The omission is quite surprising when one rereads the 1938
24. Transcript of Record, Commission Exhibit 971-9 A-B, Cement Institute, 37
F.T.C. 87 (1943).
25. Brief for Respondents, app. A, vol. III, pp. 1627-67, FTC v. Cement Institute, 333
U.S. 683 (1948).
26. Id. at 1430-39.
27. In 1934, three years prior to the filing of the FTC's complaint, Professors J. M.
Clark and Arthur R. Burns of Columbia University were hired by the Cement Institute
to make an economic study of the cement industry. A survey by questionnaire was
undertaken. Practically every responding cement manufacturer indicated that loading of
buyers' trucks was discontinued primarily because of its effects in unstabilizing prices.
For a compilation of the Clark-Burns trucking survey, see Brief for Respondent, app. C,
Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. FTC, 157 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1946)..
28. The f.o.b. mill price option is suggested, but not fully developed in STOCKING,
BASING POINT PRICING AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 34, 188 (1954) ; George, The Law
and Economics of Basing Points, Part III, Dun's Review, Nov. 1948, p. 22; Kaysen,
Basing Point Pricing and Public Policy, 63 Q.J. EcoN. 289 (1949). The author has
attempted to develop the significance of the optional pricing system in Loescher, Geo-
graphical Pricing Policies and the Law, 28 J. Bus. 211 (1954) ; Papers and Proceedings
of the Ainerican Economic Association, 45 Am. EcoN. REv. No. 2, at 524-27 (1955).
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classic by J. M. Clark, "Basing Point Methods of Price Quoting. '2 9 In dis-
cussing alternatives to the basing point system, Clark considered the possi-
bility of requiring posted f.o.b. mill pricing simultaneously with delivered
pricing, at the buyers' option, and decisively ruled out the option system-not
on the grounds that it would fail to alter price behavior, but on the contrary,
because it would create excessive price competition:
"But the greatest effect of such a plan would be on the pricing struc-
ture, and the greatest factor in this effect would be the uncertainty of the
delivered cost of goods to any'buyer. Sellers would be exposed to that
form of unfair competition which results when buyers can pretend to
have a cheaper alternative source of supply than is really open to them.
Prices on rail delivery would be reduced to meet the real or supposed
costs of truck delivery; and these reductions, not being open and general,
would be of the sort which tend naturally to develop into cut-throat com-
petition, driving prices below costs. . . . Where trucking rates are
standardized and known, most of the legitimate economies of trucking
can be secured without introducing secrecy, chaos, and cut-throat compe-
tition into the pricing system." 0
The pre-1932 experience of the cement industry without doubt convinced
Clark of the power of uncontrolled trucking to increase price flexibility in the
cement industry, but it is unlikely that the majority of economists share Clark's
fear that unrestrained competition is likely to be too severe to be "workable."
In any event, transportation barriers make for regional markets in the cement
industry, and it is hard to believe that oligopolistic restraints would be so lack-
ing (even in the absence of formula pricing) as to permit widespread bank-
ruptcy in the industry during periods of depressed demand. The elimination
of any arbitrary trade practices that restrain competition is to be welcomed,
and the Justice Department is to be congratulated for having once sought,
true to the doctrine of the Socony-Vacuum case,31 to promote "hard competi-
tion" in the cement industry.
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION'S REmEDY
Although the substance of the Justice Department's complaint in the Denver
Cement case paralleled much of the FTC's findings and order in the Cement
Institute case, the Justice Department's theory of the case differed substantially
from that of the FTC. Whereas the Justice Department primarily attacked the
restrictive transportation policies which permitted and perpetuated formula
pricing, the FTC's proceedings appeared to be aimed principally at the freight
absorption (geographical price discrimination) which made possible identical
destination pricing. In the Commission's Findings as to Fact we read, for
example:
29. 4 CAN. J. EcoN. & POL. Sci. 477 (1938).
30. 4 id. at 487.
31. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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"[T]here are price discriminations which cannot be explained or justi-
fied by differences in cost of delivery and which reflect nothing but re-
spondents' plan and effort to make their delivered prices identical at each
destination.
'32
The FTC was more concerned with eliminating freight absorption than it was
with eliminating such implementing devices as the refusal to sell to buyers'
trucks. Paragraph 3 of the FTC's order prohibited any "planned common
course of action, understanding, agreement or conspiracy" among respondents
involving
"discriminating in price between or among their respective customers by
systematically charging and accepting mill net prices which differ by the
amounts necessary to produce delivered costs to purchasers identical with
delivered costs available to such purchasers through purchases from other
respondents.
'33
This paragraph appeared to be the heart of the FTC order; and, in fact, in its
1946 brief before the Seventh Circuit the Commission argued that it was the
crux of the order. The Commission stated in the brief that
"this case will have been litigated in vain [if paragraph 3 is stricken]
even though other provisions of the order stand. For it is this systematic
discrimination and failure to make due allowance for differences in cost
of delivery that causes the identical matched delivered prices ...
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the order are applicable to petitioners collectively
and to their use and support of the basing point system. Paragraph 3
is by its nature applicable only to the respective corporate petitioners, but
to a practice which to the extent used by all would in effect recreate the
system and have the same effect in making delivered prices identical.
'34
The circuit court believed that paragraph 3 was directed at cement manu-
facturers in their individual capacity-so that were the Commission sustained,
compliance would in effect entail uniform f.o.b. mill pricing.3 5 The court was
not willing to compel such a marked alteration of pricing practices, and it
ordered the decree set aside.3 6
Appealing its case to the Supreme Court, the Commission in its brief ex-
plained that the circuit court had misapprehended the meaning and economic
effects of the 1943 order. It emphasized that all the prohibitions in the order
were of practices engaged in pursuant to a "planned common course of action";
and that the provision involving price discrimination was similarly qualified.
Uniform f.o.b. mill pricing, the Commission averred, was not being required-
32. Cement Institute, 37 F.T.C. 87, 256 (1943).
33. Id. at 261.
34. Brief for Respondent, pp. 301-02, Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. FTC, 157 F.2d
533 (7th Cir. 1946).
35. Aetna Portland Cemenit Co. v. FTC, 157 F.2d 533, 543 (7th Cir. 1946).
36. Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. FTC, supra note 35, at 573. The court also, upon
reviewing the Commission's findings, concluded that the Commission had not found suffi-
cient evidence to support its charge of agreement.
[Vol. 65: 1
INERT ANTITRUST ADMINISTRATION
even indirectly. In the words of the brief: "The order therefore leaves each
respondent free-provided he acts individually and with that variability in
action respecting particular competitive situations which is characteristic of
genuine competitive endeavor and a free market-to absorb freight in order
to meet a competitor's low price or to sell at a delivered price."'3 7 The Com-
mission in effect was thus conceding that at least sporadic meeting of competi-
tion through freight absorption did not constitute a planned common course
of action. Given this interpretation of the order, the Supreme Court upheld
the Commission's findings and order in the now famous antitrust decision of
April 1948.38
The Difficidties of Enforcement
With the Supreme Court emphasizing the qualifying "planned common
course of action" preamble to the enumerated probibitions of the FTC order,3 9
there is danger that the FTC's victory may prove to be an empty one. The
FTC order may make identical quotations on sealed bids illegal per se for
all practical purposes, since "planned" use of a formula is almost inevitably in-
volved rather than any "individual" meeting of competition ;40 and the Com-
mission can, we trust, be expected to check sealed bids to government agencies
and to undertake contempt proceedings in the event that identical destination
quotations are discovered. But this feature of the order would appear to be
the only assured significant achievement. The other easily enforced provisions
of the order are really of minor importance-such as the demise of the Cement
Institute, the discontinuance of freight rate books, and the prohibition of other
co-operative marketing practices involving statistical reports and customer
classifications. But the crucial provision of the order, aiming at formula
pricing, may never hit its target.
Proving that the Commission's order has been violated pursuant to a
"planned common course of action," may be just about impossible when identical
destination prices are quoted on commercial sales. In any future compliance
proceeding, we may expect defendant cement companies to argue that competi-
tion is being met on an "individual basis." A defendant can argue that when
quoting freight-absorbing delivered prices it merely meets the destination
price quotation that the "individual" customer evidences having received
on an invoice or advertising circular from the local cement mill. Presumably
37. Brief for Federal Trade Commission, p. 122, FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683
(1948). Moreover, in explaining the anticipated effect of the order, the brief associated
systematic freight absorption with "mutual and common use of any pricing formula." Id.
at 124-25. (Emphasis added.)
38. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
39. "It is thus apparent that the order by its terms is directed solely at concerted,
not individual activity on the part of the respondent." FTC v. Cement Institute, supra
note 38, at 728.
40. This would seem to be a reasonable inference from the Supreme Court's emphasis
on identical prices as evidence of a conspiracy, in FTC v. Cement Institute, supra note
39, at 713.
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the invoice or advertising circular indicates both the base mill price of the local
mill and some publicly announced freight rate. With a well developed system
of known freight rates in existence, it is extremely unlikely that FTC investi-
gators will in the future find evidence of overt co-operation in a volume similar
to that found in the thirties.
The same sort of enforcement problem will confront the Commission if it
seeks to undermine formula pricing through paragraph 2(b) of its order, which
prohibits
"refusing or declining, when quoting or selling cement at a price effective
at the location of the producing mill, to allow purchasers to provide
transportation by any means, at any cost, or to any place they may
desire."
41
Controlled trucking will violate the FTC's order only when a "planned
common course of action, understanding, agreement, combination, or con-
spiracy" is involved.42 How will the FTC demonstrate that an "agreement"
or "understanding" is the basis for the refusal to sell to buyers' trucks? Will
not the companies testify that "individual company policy" dictates the refusal
to load buyers' trucks? The rationalizations are not difficult to imagine:
"The traffic around the mill would be too congested with buyers' trucks;
accidents would occur; buyers' trucks are not of standard size and loading of
such trucks would be excessively costly; moreover, our dealers who are not
equipped to do their own trucking would suffer a competitive disadvantage."
The clincher in areas of the country where all trucking was permanently dis-
continued in the early thirties would be: "We no longer have roads and
loading platforms to service any trucks." The fact that loading equipment
was allowed to be scrapped because it was no longer needed after the initial
agreement to eliminate trucking was made would presumably go unmentioned
in the statement of "individual company policy" made by the manufacturer.
The difficulty is that although a "planned common course of action" was neces-
sary to eliminate unstabilizing trucking in the years around 1932, once trucking
was controlled common planning was no longer necessary to prevent its re-
emergence.
In some future suit for compliance charging contempt of the order, an
enterprising Commission might seek to challenge identical destination pricing
by arguing that compliance requires some affirmative action to demonstrate
discontinuance of the planned common course of action. Some noncoercive
beating of competition might constitute such affirmative action. In the pene-
tration of rivals' markets, absent an "understanding," individual self-interest
and a hunger for tonnage would require a manufacturer to attempt some beat-
ing of competition. Or, to demonstrate that the "plan" has been discontinued,
a firm could be expected to lower the mill nets that it receives at particular
destinations in its natural market in order to avoid always having its destina-




tion prices met by distant competitors. This possible line of compliance action
has some merit, although the question how much beating would satisfy the
requisite of "some beating" is a poser. But the argument is a novel one,
43
and a very persuasive presentation would undoubtedly be necessary to win a
contempt verdict in the courts. And contempt proceedings would have to
be initiated anew every time the FTC discovered that pricing practices had
fallen into the old rut of formula identities.
The Commission might also argue that affirmative action is required to
discontinue the implementation of the formula which began when trucking was
eliminated or controlled by "planned common course of action," and that
willingness to load buyers' trucks is necessary to evidence such affirmative be-
havior. The advantage of this approach is that once the Commission got un-
controlled trucking reinstituted, the mere oligopolistic will to adhere to a
system of identical prices would no longer be sufficient to insure formula pric-
ing. Of course, a difficult and extremely persuasive presentation of the re-
quired "affirmative action" argument would be necessary for the FTC to
convince the courts that contempt of the order was inherent in a continued
widespread refusal to sell to buyers' trucks. In sum, whichever route the
Commission may choose in seeking compliance with its order, the fact that
"planned common course of action" prefaces each prohibition in the order will
complicate enforcement problems.
The Adequacy of the FTC Remedy
As has been shown, the FTC order will be difficult to enforce against the
mere adherence to a geographical pricing formula and the mere implementa-
tion of the formula system by refusing to load buyers' trucks. But with the
change in composition of the commissioners that began in the spring of 1953
notice was served that the Commission would not even attempt to apply the
novel doctrine of "required affirmative action" to either aspect of formula
pricing.44 A few months before the Justice Department dismissed the Denver
Cement case, the new majority of the commissioners reported that they would
43. Application of the argument, rather than its proposal, constitutes the novelty.
See Handler's persuasive discussion in Anti-Trust--New Frontiers and New Perplexities,
6 REcoa 59 (1951).
44. In Alabama Metal Lath Co., Docket No. 5449, FTC, Feb. 16, 1954 (mimeograph),
the Commission dismissed a complaint despite a showing that: (1) respondents had
previously operated under a license agreement pursuant to which a set of minimum de-
livered prices for designated geographical zones had been established; and (2) after the
termination of this agreement subsequent price increases by each respondent had been
identical in amount and had occurred at approximately the same times. The FTC sup-
ported its dismissal by noting that "there is no evidence that these increases resulted
from any agreement or understanding between the respondents." Id. at p. 3.
The Alabama Metal Lath holding appears to represent a difference in viewpoint be-
tween the present and the prior membership of the FTC. In National Lead Co., 49 F.T.C.
791 (1953), the old Commission had found a conspiracy to restrain price competition upon
a showing of the mere existence of parallel pricing in rigid accordance with a common
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not challenge any "individual" freight absorption to meet competition-the
only qualification being the vague moral test of "good faith. ' '4 5 The implication
seemed to be that the Commission majority did not plan to infer "planned
common course of action" from mere patterns of identical delivered prices on
commercial sales, no matter how rigid and systematic the identities. It appears
that the new leadership of the Commission was prepared to speak much about
increasing compliance activity,46 but old fashioned collusion was to remain
the crucial test of violation. Novel theories and radical approaches were to be
avoided."7 Therefore, it is not surprising that Commission attorneys with
whom I have spoken refer to being helpless when it comes to enforcing the
cement order against controlled trucking practices. Anticipating the philoso-
phy of the majority of commissioners, these attorneys have also adopted the
conventional approach to compliance. Evidently the Commission has lost cer-
tain attorneys who wished to argue that compliance requires affirmative action
to eliminate the continuing effects of the past trucking "agreements."
Perhaps the Justice Department is no more venturesome than the FTC; and
in any event following the Supreme Court's decision in the FTC's Cetet I;z-
stitute case, all but one of the Department's own objectives had been achieved.
That one exception was paragraph 6 of the Department's prayer-which, as
has been shown, was drawn with markedly superior craftsmanship to that of
the corresponding provision of the FTC order. Paragraph 6, requiring cement
producers to offer both delivered prices and f.o.b. mill base prices so that
buyers could elect to provide their own transportation, was specifically directed
at individual cement manufacturers-while the corresponding provision of the
FTC's order was phrased to affect only collective pricing practices. Paragraph
6 would have been virtually self-enforcing-while enforcement of the FTC's
order would be complicated by its conspiracy phraseology. While the FTC
order is unlikely to affect the pricing practices of the industry, paragraph 6
would have virtually guaranteed a return to competitive pricing.
The superiority of its remedy seems to have been one of the reasons for
the Department's commencing its suit in the first place, while the FTC order
was being appealed. That superiority was still patent when the Justice De-
partment dismissed its suit on August 27, 1953, with the announcement that
"the existing order of the Federal Trade Commission, affirmed by the Supreme
zone formula. As in Alabama Metal Lath, the evidence showed that respondents had at
one time operated under an actual price fixing agreement.
Of the five Commissioners who sat in Alabama Metal Lath only two took part in the
National Lead case. It is interesting to note that the writer of the majority opinion in
National Lead delivered a strong dissent in Alabama Metal Lath, while the lone dissenter
in National Lead sided with the majority in the later case.
45. See Change Reported in View on Pricing-F.T.C.'s New Attitude Toward Con-
troversial Basing Point System Held Significant, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1953, p. 21, col. 4.
46. See F.T.C. to Review 14,000 Documents-Orders and Trade Practice Riles to
be Sifted i New Compliance Program, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1954, p. 33, col. 5.
47. See 'Hard-Core' Cases Are F.T.C. Target, N.Y. Times, March 10, 1954, p. 35, col. 2.
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Court in 1948, appears to provide ample protection against a revival of the
old practices.
'48
THE CHANGES IN THE CEMENT INDUSTRY SINCE THE CEMENT
INSTITUTE CASE
The Justice Department's press release announcing the dropping of the
Dcnz'er Cement suit emphasized that practices in the cement industry had sub-
stantially changed since the decision in the Cement Institute case. It pointed
out that the Cement Institute had been disbanded in 1946, that the circulation
of freight rate books had been discontinued and that substantial variation ex-
isted on bids for government contracts. 49 These three welcome developments
were to have been expected as results of the more easily enforced provisions
of the FTC order. The Department also asserted that the degree of uniformity
in prices on sales to commercial buyers had materially decreased, and that "a
majority of the cement companies now sell cement f.o.b. their mills, and permit
transportation by truck, when requested to do so by the buyers." 0  And it
concluded on the basis of these "facts" that the conspiracy and its effects had
been dissipated, so that a further court decree was no longer necessary-
especially in view of the asserted adequacy of the FTC's outstanding order.51
Two of the "factual" premises on which the Department's conclusions were
based are, it is submitted, faulty. First, there is the matter of the proper
interpretation to be given to the nonidentities in destination prices. Since 1948
there has been a temporary (and I believe it is only temporary) 5 2 shift to a
form " of f.o.b. mill selling by most of the cement producers. The existence
of the resulting differences in destination prices would indeed have complicated
the task of the Justice Department in demonstrating the continued existence
of a conspiracy, and winning the approval of paragraph 6 by court decree
would not have been an easy matter. However, the significance of the material
reduction in uniformity of destination prices is slight in the context of the
48. United States v. Cement Institute, CCH TRADE REG. REP. 166090, at 66147 (Aug.
27, 1953).
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid. The press release emphasized that the "primary purposes" for which the suit
had been filed were, among others, "to break up the practice of the defendant cement com-
panies refusing to sell cement f.o.b. the mill if the buyers so requested; to permit buyers
to use truck transportation without being discriminated against in price if they desired to
use truck rather than rail transportation." Id. at p. 66146.
51. Id. at p. 66147.
52. An apparently typical reply to a 1953 trade journal questionnaire concerning pric-
ing practices in the cement industry was that of "a large Midwestern producer: 'As long
as we can continue to sell our product without freight absorption, we will do so. When
and if it becomes necessary to absorb freight to become competitive, we will do so.'" Quoted
in Trauffer, 1953 Seventh Consecutive Peak Year, Pit and Quarry, Jan. 1954, p. 106, at 110.
53. A majority of mills were quoting prices f.o.b. mill, rail car. Even when quotations
were made f.o.b. mill, truck, only a small minority of mills would quote for trucks owned
or controlled by the buyers. See text following note 68 infra.
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cement boom which has persisted since 1948,5 4 for the booming demand is a
more likely explanation for the alteration in pricing patterns than any voluntary
abandonment of noncompetitive practices. And second, there is the matter of
the justice Department's information regarding trucking, which will be shown
to be either irrelevant or erroneous. Not only did the Department lack infor-
mation to support its statement concerning the prevelance of sales f.o.b. mill
to buyers' trucks,55 but it failed to make a distinction between controlled and
uncontrolled trucking. And only uncontrolled trucking, as we have seen,
can destroy the pricing formula.
Economic Conditions and Pricing Strategy
Excess capacity, which had plagued the cement industry since the latter part
of the 1920's, finally began to disappear by 1947. Even World War II had not
greatly benefited the industry because of the restrictions on construction activ-
ity. In terms of percentage of theoretical capacity untilized, 1947 was the best
year of activity since 1927, the percentages in 1948 and 1949 were even better,
and with the abatement of cement strikes and shortages of kiln fuel and
freight cars, the rate of capacity utilized has been still higher in later years.5
The construction boom so increased demand for cement that trade journals
regularly reported severe shortages during the summer months from 1948 to
1952.
57
Concomitant with the postwar boom in cement production there began a
marked reduction in the amount of freight being absorbed.5 s Rather than
54. Unlike the steel industry, the cement industry, bolstered by the prolonged con-
struction boom, did not face the temporary contractions in demand that plagued steel in
1949-50 and 1953-54. "Cement has been in tight supply in most areas since the end of the
war, even though the industry has increased its capacity by one sixth since 1945." Pit and
Quarry, Jan. 1955, p. 104.
55. Upon a request for a list of mills at which cement producers would sell f.o.b. mill
to buyers' trucks, I was informed in a letter from Assistant Attorney General Stanley N.
Barnes, dated January 28, 1954, that the Justice Department had not compiled such infor-
mation.
56. Theoretical capacity overstates practical capacity, primarily because of the seasonal
nature of demand and the excessive expense involved in constructing sufficient storage
capacity to permit year-round kiln operation. Theoretical capacity tended to overstate
practical capacity during the latter forties because of labor disputes as well. The follow-
ing selected annual figures, showing the percentage of theoretical capacity utilized, illus-
trate the cement boom of the twenties and the one of recent years: 1923--84.9% ; 1925-
83.5%; 1927-76.3%; 1929-65.9%; 1947-74.9%; 1949-81.0%; 1951-87.4%; 1953-
90.3%. U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, MINERALS YEARBOOK (selected years).
57. See Business Week, Sept. 4, 1948, p. 30; Oil and Gas Journal, Jan. 6, 1949, p. 40;
Concrete, Oct. 1950, p. 11; Engineering News Record, Oct. 11, 1951, pp. 23-24.
58. Cement shortages began to develop in 1947, see Rock Products, March 1948, p. 151,
and two producers in the Lehigh Valley area of Pennsylvania informed the author during
an interview in April 1949 that their concerns had begun to withdraw from the markets
in much of Virginia prior to the Supreme Court's Cement Institute decision. It was more
profitable to substitute customers in the unsatiated markets in eastern Pennsylvania,
eastern New York and New Jersey, where higher mill nets could be obtained, for customers
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continue to service customers in distant markets where adherence to the basing
point system entailed large reductions in mill nets (when alternative sales
could be made at higher mill nets in less distant markets), cement manu-
facturers tended to shrink the range of their marketing areas, though they
continued to "meet competition" in order to retain certain desired customers
in markets where freight absorption was less costly. Some unfulfilled demand
was developing in the natural markets of the mills. The price of cement was
held down apparently for reasons of administrative policy in many regions of
the country, and cement was allocated to customers by non-price rationing,
with the sacrifice of at least short run profits. Following the Cement Institute
decision, a two-fold advantage appeared to follow from a rapid shift to a form
of f.o.b. mill pricing. First, the unsatiated demand in the market was such
that a producer would rarely lose sales by adhering to a uniform f.o.b. mill
price. And so while customers could be retained, profits could be enhanced
by eliminating freight absorptions. Customers' good will did not need to be
lost in the process, since "confusion" over interpretation of the FTC's order
could be made the scapegoat.50 Secondly, a political move seems to have been
afoot to bring pressure on Congress to legalize categorically the basing point
system.0° Announcing that the Cement Institute decision required uniform
mill net f.o.b. pricing, United States Steel Corporation's subsidiary, Universal-
Atlas Cement Company, switched to uniform f.o.b. mill pricing in early July
1948.61 Not only did almost the entire cement industry follow Universal-Atlas'
lead, 6 2 but within three weeks virtually the entire steel industry followed the
similar lead of the Steel Corporation.
63
in Virginia markets where the basing point system of pricing entailed large freight absorp-
tion. A similar phenomenon had developed much earlier in the steel industry, which had
been rationing short supplies since the beginning of World War II. See Senate Special
Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business, Changes in Distribution of
Steel, 1940-47, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., report No. 44, at 25 (1949).
59. See Stocking, The Law on Basing Point Pricing: Confitsion or Competition, 2
J. Pun. L. 1 (1953).
60. "Adoption last week by several major steel companies of the f.o.b.-mill pricing
system that the industry has vigorously opposed for the last quarter century, represented
a gamble by the steel industry that unfavorable public and industrial reaction eventually
will spur Congress to legalize the basing-point method of computing prices-the practice
just discarded, under protest, by both the cement and steel industries." Mullaney, Steel
Ruling Seen as a Boomerang, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1948, § 3, p. IF, col. 4. See also Basing
Point Blues, Wall Street Journal, July 29, 1948, p. 1, col. 6; Latham, The Politics of Basing
Point Legislation, 15 LAw & CONTEmP. PRon. 272 (1950).
61. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1948, p. 33, col. 1.
62. However, Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. published to its dealers, shortly after the
Supreme Court decision, a statement on sales policy indicating its plans to continue to
meet competition where its commercial interest was involved. Marquette States Policy
on Supreme Court Decision, Rock Products, June 1948, P. 97. Moreover, Marquette in a
letter to its customers on July 20, 1948 reiterated its position, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1948,
p. 39, col. 5, despite reports that most major cement producers had discontinued or were
going to discontinue freight absorption. See Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1948, p. 3, col. 1.
63. Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1948, p. 3, col. 1; July 15, 1948, p. 14, col. 1; July
13, 1948, p. 4, col. 4; July 9, 1948, p. 3, col. 1; July 8, 1948, p. 1, col. 6.
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It seems exceedingly possible that a primary purpose of the switch in pricing
policy was to inflict sufficient price increases on particular customers (who
had well-established purchasing relationships with distant mills) so that the
disgruntled customers would demand new legislation to approve a regularized
basing point system. Although the President in the summer of 1950 vetoed
the only such bill that to date has passed both houses of Congress,64 bills to
legalize basing point systems (or equivalents, in the form of unqualified legali-
zations of "good faith meeting of competition") have continued to be proposed
during each session of Congress.' Given the continuation of the cement boom,
and the objectives of political strategy, it is little wonder that Justice Depart-
ment inquiries disclosed a material reduction in the frequency of identical
destination prices on commercial sales. It is a wonder, however, that the
Justice Department's analysts neglected, or failed to understand, that formula
pricing of the basing point variety is primarily a reserve tool to prevent a
weakening in the price level whenever excess capacity develops.
We may expect that upon an eventual easing of the cement boom, competi-
tion for commercial sales will lead to a regular meeting of destination prices,
performed on a so-called "individual basis"-as recently recommenced in the
steel industry.66 So long as trucking is controlled, any distant mill seeking
to quote identically to a buyer in a rival's natural market need only look at the
rival's invoice or advertising circular (showing base price plus reported trans-
portation charge) in order to "meet competition." Under the circumstances,
freight absorption will not develop into the unsystematic variety which de-
stabilizes the industry's price structure, unless direct government purchases
loom large in volume 67 and the rivalry unleashed via nonidentical bidding
spreads to commercial sales.
There is evidence other than the recent resumption of systematic freight
64. S. 1008 (O'Mahoney), 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), passed by Congress on
June 2, 1950, 96 CONG. REc. 7977 (1950), and vetoed by the President on June 16, 1950, 96
CoNG. Rxc. 8721-23 (1950).
65. S. 719 (McCarran), 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) ; H.R. 2820 (Walter), 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1951) ; S. 540 (McCarran), 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) ; S. 1377 (Capehart),
83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); H.R. 4170 (Walter), 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); S. 780
(Capehart), 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); HR. 4958 (Walter), 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955) ; H.R. 6875 (Walter), 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
66. Freight absorption on a so-called "individual basis" evidently became routine in the
steel industry according to reports in various issues of Iron Age during the lull in the
demand for steel between September 1953 and November 1954. It was reported that the
extensive freight absorption might cost as much as $70 million in 1954, or an average of
75 cents to $1.00 per ton. Iron Age, July 29, 1954, p. 45. Trucking, however, had been
largely controlled in the steel industry and the ensuing freight absorption was apparently
very systematic. See Loescher, in Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic
Association, 45 Aw. EcoN. Ray. No. 2, at 524-27 (1955).
67. The preponderance of cement sales have been to commercial buyers during the
postwar period. Even highway work in many states is performed on a contract basis, with
the contractor purchasing his cement directly. Sealed bidding is not practiced in the quot-
ing of cement prices to contractors.
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absorption in the steel industry, to justify a forecast that some formula pricing
system for commercial sales will come to be reinstituted in the cement industry.
For one thing, of the 55 cement companies that filed compliance reports
with the FTC in September 1948, 37 cement companies stated definitely their
intention to absorb freight: 15 did not clearly describe their intentions con-
cerning freight absorption; while only 3 indicated that their interpretation of
the order had the practical effect of preventing freight absorption.68 Further-
more, during the recent period of so-called f.o.b. mill pricing, practically every
mill east of the Rocky Mountains has sold f.o.b. mill only rail car, or, as in
many areas of the Middle West, f.o.b. mill onily rail car or controlled truck
(common carrier, manufacturer's contract carrier, or manufacturer's own
trucks) ." It seems unlikely that a flagrantly arbitrary system of transporta-
tion would have been preserved had not the cement manufacturers planned to
reinstitute regularized interpenetration of markets, dependent upon known
freight elements. Were sales to remain on a uniform f.o.b. mill basis, the
producers would have no real incentive to deny to buyers in their natural mar-
kets the convenience and economy of customer-chosen truck transportation."
The Trucking Situation
The Justice Department's statement that "a majority of the cement com-
panies now sell cement f.o.b. their mills, and permit transportation by truck,
when requested to do so by the buyers" 7' seems to indicate that the Depart-
ment made no more than a superficial investigation of the reliability of its
trucking information. Transportation data on cement shipments is regularly
collected by the Bureau of Mines. Information assembled at the Bureau for
1952 (but as yet unpublished) shows that in nine out of nineteen cement pro-
ducing districts there was no (or virtually no) trucking.7 2 Even these data,
however, markedly understate manufacturers' restrictions on trucking for the
68. Wallace & Douglas, Antitrust Policies and the New Attack on the Federal Trade
Commission, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 684, 697 (1952).
69. See also text following note 75 infra.
70. One of my colleagues shares in the partnership operation of a building supply dealer-
ship at Mitchell, Indiana. A cement mill within one mile of their warehouse will not load
the firm's trucks, but requires that they take delivery in trucks of the established trucking
contractor or in the cars of the B. & 0. Railroad. A saving in transportation charges is
denied the building supply firm which possesses unutilized capacity in the form of trucks
and drivers.
71. United States v. Cement Institute, CCH TRADE REo. RaP. ff 66090, at 66147 (Aug.
27, 1953).
72. Districts with no (or virtually no) trucking of cement from mills in 1952: District
# -Eastern Pennsylvania and Maryland; District #6-Illinois; District #&-Alabama;
District #9-Tennessee; District #10-Virginia, Georgia, Louisiana, Florida, South Caro-
lina, Mississippi; District #11-Iowa; District #13-Kansas; District #14-Western
Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Arkansas; District #15-Texas. This information was
gathered by this writer in the offices of the U.S. Bureau of Mines, Washington, D.C., from
data prepared by staff members of the Bureau.
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reasons that (1) in some districts there may be trucking at a few but not at
all mills, and (2) even where trucking exists, the trucking may be controlled.
The author made a survey of cement manufacturers and of certain groups
of commercial purchasers 73 last year. The findings are that in the period
1953-1954 uncontrolled trucking was, as a rule, being practiced only in the
Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast areas. Controlled trucking was prevalent
from mills in western Pennsylvania, western New York, Ohio, Michigan,
Indiana, Kentucky, Wisconsin and southern Texas. In the remaining portions
of the United States, as a rule, mills shipped cement by rail only. Of some
149 mills in the United States operated in August 1953 by 59 defendant com-
panies in the Justice Department's suit,74 only 61 mills (about 41 per cent)
shipped by truck at all, and only 25 mills (about 17 per cent) shipped by un-
controlled truck.
But let us examine the particular wording used in the Justice Department's
assertion that "a majority of the cement companies now sell cement f.o.b. their
mills, and permit transportation by truck, when requested to do so by the
buyers. ' 75 My research, based on the period 1953-54, would appear to support
any of the following different statements:
1. 38 of 59 defendant companies (64 per cent) were allowing at least
some form of truck transportation from at least one of their mills.
2. 30 of 59 defendant companies (51 per cent) were allowing at least
some form of truck transportation from each of their mills.
3. 13 of 59 defendant companies (22 per cent) were allowing uincon-
trolled truck transportation from at least one of their mills.
4. 11 of 59 defendant companies (19 per cent) were allowing uncon-
trolled truck transportation from each of their mills.
Nondiscriminatory handling of buyers' trucking is, then, limited to just a
few companies, and it is found primarily in the Far West. Although buyers'
trucking (if not controlled in the future) can be expected to increase price flexi-
bility on the Pacific Coast, it will probably constitute a less significant factor
in the Rocky Mountain region, come the eventual easing of demand, because
Ideal Cement Co., a multiple plant concern, dominates the area with about
75 per cent of the installed capacity.7 6 In other regions, where uncontrolled
73. Questionnaires were sent to purchasers (producers of ready-mix concrete and
concrete products) in mill areas where cement manufacturers had either been unwilling
to respond or else insufficiently clear in their responses to the questionnaires.
74. The number of defendant companies had undergone some significant shrinkage
since 1945 as attritions and acquisitions had occurred in the industry. In addition to 59
consolidated defendant companies there were 4 other cement companies operating in the
industry in the summer of 1953. Each of the non-defendant companies operated a single
mill, resulting in a total of 63 companies and 153 mills. Of these 4 non-defendant companies,
2 practiced uncontrolled trucking, 1 controlled trucking, while the transportation policy
of the fourth concern (owned by the state of South Dakota) has not been ascertained to date.
75. See note 71 supra.
76. Based on data in Geographical List of Plants, PIT AND QuAmRY HANDBOOK, 1953,
at 117-D - 278-D.
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trucking provided the important source of price flexibility during the period
1927-1932, trucking is now either nonexistent or regulated.
In sum, it appears that the Justice Department erred both in evaluating
the importance of the recent change to nonidentical destination pricing, and
in concluding that free trucking had been embraced by the cement industry.
And primarily because of these errors, the Department threw away its chance
to guarantee free trucking and, through it, competitive pricing.
CONCLUSION
I have intentionally avoided discussing in this essay several important ele-
ments in the market structure of the cement industry that condition competitive
behavior. No consideration has been given to the relative degree of ownership
concentration in each regional cement market; to the significance of multi-plant
chain companies and their continued acquisition of independents; or to the
problem of geographical price discrimination when practiced between firms of
varying size and geographical diversification. The foregoing elements repre-
sent many of the important complications that necessarily operate to impede
the effectiveness of competition in the cement industry. However, even in the
absence of alteration of market structures, there is good reason to believe that
competitive behavior would be substantially improved if buyers were given
the option of transporting in their own trucks purchases made at a posted
f.o.b. mill price. Subsequent to the current cement boom, uncontrolled trucking
would tend to transform the formerly sluggish and wasteful nonprice competi-
tion into unsystematic freight absorption, conducive to base price flexibility.
The Justice Department has carelessly tossed away an opportunity to gain
an effective, self-enforcing order striking at formula pricing in the cement in-
dustry. Freight factors continue to be known to all destinations from most
mills in the industry. Consequently, when the present feverish demand finally
shows some sign of abatement, and freight absorption becomes quite general,
we have every reason to believe that the meeting of competition will very much
resemble the multiple basing point system of old. It is true that the system of
non-base mills will be gone, formal freight rate books will be gone and, let us
hope, identical quotations on sealed bids to governmental agencies will con-
tinue to be gone. However, it seems likely that meeting of competition in
commercial sales on the so-called "individual basis" will still result in system-
atic freight absorption. The freight absorbing mill will simply meet its com-
petitor's destination price, computed on the rival's base mill price plus the
publicly announced freight (rail or truck) rate from that mill to destination.
So long as cement producers are not compelled to offer buyers an opportunity
to purchase at a posted mill price and transport in their own trucks, the
essential ingredients of a geographical pricing formula remain. The FTC's
outstanding order, because of its "planned common course of action" preamble,
will not be easily enforced. Given the eventual resurrection of systematic
freight absorption in the cement industry, the order can be used against the
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resulting practices only if a bold staff will adopt novel theories of compliance.
Yet the present leadership among the commissioners is disinclined to develop
and apply novel antitrust law. Nevertheless the public has been told by the
Justice Department that substantial and inferredly voluntary changes have been
made in the marketing practices of the cement industry, and that the FTC
order will be fully efficacious in preventing any re-emergence of noncompetitive
pricing. If the Denver Cement case was dismissed because it aimed at peri-
pheral violations and threatened "possible extensions of legal theories based
upon political and sociological doctrines and belief," 77 then do let us have our
antitrust policy based more upon "theories, doctrines and belief" and less upon
summary analyses and myopic realism.
77. Barnes, The Judge Looks at Antitrust, AmEcAx BAR AssocIAToN S-CrION OF
ANTITusT LAw, PROCEEDINGS AT THE ANNUAL MEETING, Aug. 26-27, 1953, pp. 13-17.
